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7 November 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES

SUBJECT : RADIO PLAN RECAPITULATION OF [ ] FUTURE PLANNING.

Ref : [ ] 412 (IN 26813), [ ] 430 (IN 27539), [ ] 434  
(IN 27735)

I. PLAN "A" - Present Operations (Semi-overt):

[ ] is Net Control Station (NCS) with call sign [ ] on radio teletype link to [ ], and uses call sign [ ] on manual circuits to following secondary stations:

2. PLAN "B": (Closing of [ ] NCS for reasons other than FONOFF)

Closing of [ ] as NCS and re-siting NCS function elsewhere, probably [ ]. Closing of NCS function NOT as result of FONOFF orders.

Under this plan, [ ] thus becomes secondary station in equivalent class with present [ ] station (complement of three operators and medium power - 100 watt - transmitters and considerably reduced station physically and in appearance) and possibly includes removal to some other site within [ ] Ciphers handled as presently.

3. PLAN "C": (Closing of [ ] NCS for FONOFF orders)

Close out NCS and major base functions. [ ] becomes secondary station as follows:

(1). Vastly decreased physical size and personnel complement - probably re-siting of station locally.

(2). Assumption of [ ] call [ ] on standard net frequencies in place of present [ ] cancelled completely.

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(3). All traffic to be enciphered in OUR pads  
to avoid overt recognition on part of monitors on  
[ ] net frequencies.

(4). [ ] holds base end of these ciphers above.

4. Additional planning not affected by above calls for the  
assignment of a call sign to the inactive station at [ ] which  
would be activated as [ ] station in emergency only.

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ATTACHMENT A.


CIPHER PATTERN



ADDITIONAL LOCAL CIRCUITS PROPOSED:

1.

2.



Establishment of above circuits in addition to present  
allows either [redacted] to become [redacted] NCS  
with WASHINGTON as outlet.

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## ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO THE RADIO PLAN: RECAPITULATION .....

Comments on this memorandum represent the personal opinions and viewpoint of the author.

## 1. PLAN "B".

1. Plan "B", as I see it, is self-explanatory and is in reality simply a condensation of the net function in its present security condition, with the sole shift being in removing the accent on physical size, traffic load, and personnel concentration from the present [ ] base to some other base site. It has become increasingly obvious that [ ] as a base site leaves much to be desired, politically, economically, and in an engineering sense. As we are all aware, minor political pressure on the part of the [ ] has been constant and can be expected to increase. The strong possibility exists that the Foreign Office (FONOFF) will order the station to close down in the near future. If such an order is issued by the Foreign Office, or should our thinking dictate the closure of the [ ] base and the re-siteing of the base function elsewhere, we are immediately faced with the problem of selecting a new base site and the communications pattern which will follow as a result. Three possible alternate sites have been discussed at various times, as follows:

(a). [ ] The major advantage of locating the base at [ ] lies in the ionospheric predictions on the radio propagation between [ ] Europe, and Washington. However, the major advantage is offset by a serious disadvantages, such as the political instability of [ ] the present restrictions on increasing our installation at [ ] reflected by the State Department, and, in general, the dubious future of an [ ] base station. In addition to these factors, transportation and supply lines are extremely difficult for bulky equipment, inasmuch as air transportation is the principal method of supplying the [ ] capital and rail connections are inefficient and overly time-consuming.

(b). [ ], and has been suggested by [ ] as a possible base site. The supply line through [ ] to service this location should prove adequate in the future inasmuch as [ ] reports that [ ] is improving the roads between [ ] at the present time. The station site would be located in the minor mountain range, well out of the unhealthy seacoast area, and

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would provide a good location both from a health standpoint and from a technical radio standpoint. The most apparent disadvantage to this location lies in the indefinite status of roads and lack of information in general concerning the site.

25X1 (c). [ ] This location has been our supply base and basic supply routing point since the net was established. It has obvious advantages as follows:

25X1 (k). Efficient (for this area) supply access to other [ ]

25X1 [ ] The most serious disadvantage, from the standpoint of establishing a base site in [ ] lies in the sand and dust storms prevalent in the area, causing tremendous noise levels (sand and dust static). In addition, [ ] is not well sited from an ionospheric prediction standpoint, although it is roughly equivalent to [ ], as far as Europe-Washington contacts are concerned. In a physical sense, considering the new construction program [ ] is admirably suited for the establishment of a major base radio station, inasmuch as extensive antenna arrangements may be erected without causing undue political unrest and further additional quonsets may be sent from Washington as required to adequately house and service a major radio station and its personnel. 25X1

~~(2) xxxxxxxx a number of reasons why the [ ] base function could be transferred to the [ ]~~ 25X1

2. There are a number of reasons why the [ ] base function could be transferred, other than by order of the [ ] Foreign Office. 25X1

(1). Housing in general, economic factors, etc., which are extremely negative in [ ] 25X1

(2). Lack of State cooperation in [ ], compared with other locations in the area. 25X1


25X1 (3). Inability to maintain an adequate supply line to [ ] from the supply base [ ] as a result of decreasing military air efficiency and air quotas for our use. 25X1

(4). Political instability and proximity to Northern Borders.

3. It appears to the writer that all factors considered, [ ]

25X1 is the logical place to site the future base station function,  
25X1 thus reducing [ ] to a secondary station in a class with the  
25X1 present [ ] radio station, with the added factor that, due  
to servicing the two military missions and the major Embassy, it  
is anticipated that three operators will be required to man the  
secondary [ ] radio station. In addition, it is suggested  
that the present major base station be removed in toto, and a  
secondary type station set up in a different physical location  
from that now occupied by the present [ ] base. Under 25X1  
Plan "B", there would be no change in cipher procedure or routing,  
except that, of course, traffic would be routed through another  
25X1 base station to [ ] from the U.S. outlet [ ] at present) 25X1

25X1

  
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